Turkey's Strategy towards the Kurdish Language

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Abstract: This paper analyses the strategy of Turkey against the Kurdish Language that resulted in a purposeful linguistic suicide in Kurdish rejection. Long persecutions, which led to mass killings, Kurd's rehabilitation, incarceration, restriction of Turkish educational activity and, finally, the legal ban on media and printing Kurdish, prompted worries about the long-term sustainability of the Language. In addition, it highlights the processes of revival in political and educational life, which have facilitated Kurdish usage. I analyze the different perspectives and duties of the governmental authorities and other ideology organizations in promoting Kurdish in Turkey as a second local language to assess these continuous gains.

Keywords: Turkey, Strategy, Kurdish Language, Resistance, and Recognition.

1. Introduction

A large ethnic, linguistic and religious variation was still prominent in the early 20th century, before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire [1]. As a consequence of the Greek-Turkish population exchange and the Armenian genocide, this respectable diversity gradually declined. The Kurds were the biggest surviving group, but numerous minorities survived. The 2004 European Commission research shows that approximately 25% of the 77 million inhabitants of Turkey are Kurds. Turkish is the second language most spoken in the world [2]. However, due to various straightening and assimilation techniques aimed against the minority, several limitations affected their Language (Kurdish). Turkish language development has resulted in unequal development in the Turkish and Kurdistan languages, in particular in the pedagogical framework of the schools. This paper focuses on the Kurdish methods

of the Turkish nation and the language philosophy of the country. In this manner, I comprehend what authority meant by the basic norm of what has occurred. It is essential in any case to recognize that oppressive methods extend beyond the limits of linguistic rights. Hiding a language in this sense is never the whole oppressive strategy of a state towards minorities; for example, the presence of Kurds was influenced by relocation and arrests and denying them the ability to communicate in their Language. Education has a role in Kurdish and Turkish unequal growth. Between 1914 and 1918, literacy among the Ottoman people was never surpassed 10%; even the Turkish Language shifted from Arabic to Latin. Thus, it would be easier and without any opposition to allowing the claimed 'Turkification' techniques and spread of Turkish, along with the differences between the letters. To build a coherent Turkish national identity, the high rates of illiteracy have typically led to the Turkish being imposed on ignorant people and to force the general public to assess the most effective method for Turkish creation.

Consequently, Turkish was used extensively, and some groups were eventually excluded, and the various languages of the old empire disappeared [1]. Thus, although Turkish became a comprehensive, widespread language, extensively utilized and often used in everyday life, it was ignored and prohibited from the Kurdish Language in such a way that it came to nothing in its writing. Linking Kurdish to education shows that although the learning was designed to enhance the distinctive Turkish identity, its development made it possible for a Kurdish character to ascend. Consequently, the educated Kurds have taken the Kurdish issue forward and, after decades of struggle with the Turkish people, their efforts have ultimately culminated in the introduction of the Kurd. At the same time, education efforts in eastern and southern Turkey were not completely implemented, with a chronic lack of information among Kurdish women. These women were particularly crucial in preserving the Kurdish Language since they were not as knowledgeable in the Turkish Language as their more educated husbands.

2. Methodology

For my study, I use a mix of primary and secondary sources. My primary sources of information are mainly government official reports, newspaper articles, such as the Turkish Constitution, and real ideology websites. As for secondary materials, I have combined books and articles on the Kurdish issue into the changing dispute to follow Turkey's actions against the Kurdish Language of the twentieth century. I relied on the work of social scientists and certain linguistic specialists mainly for my studies.

3. Kurdish Speaking Areas and Migration

Kurdish is split into two dialects in Turkey: Kurmanji's most often spoken, while the less frequently spoken is Dimili. Both of them are in the Indo-European family of languages, in Iranian more

specifically. While most Kurdish speakers in the Southeast remained stable, the number of Kurdish speakers in central Turkey grew. These days, Kurdish speakers spread throughout Turkey steadily. It is believed that around 4,000,000 Kurds reside in Istanbul alone, out of 12 million citizens [3]. The exact number of Kurdish speakers is impossible to establish since Turkish citizens have no ethnic or linguistic statistics. Because of intermarriage, it is extremely hard to determine the exact number of Kurdish speakers; while they are not competent in the Language, some may recognize them as Kurds. Another person may recognize that Turks are still able to talk in Kurdish. The Turkish process of centralization triggered numerous Kurdish rebellions, ruthlessly disbanded via mass executions [4]. Kurds have been forced into massive migrations to Turkish controlled urban regions to quell rebellions and retain control of the Kurdish people. In addition, in the 1920s-1940s, mass killings of Turkish officials were ordered after each uprising, and Turkish immigrants moved in Kurdish areas from Europe. Today, the Turkish army controlled all the Kurdish areas, which were responsible for dealing with and stopping disturbances in the Kurdish-overrun territories.

Prime Minister Smet Nönú also supported the assimilation plans based on the Turkish and Kurdish migration to reduce the Southeast Kurdish population. Additional costs supported this reorganization of Turks and Kurds because of the underdevelopment of the regions. It anticipated that education programmes would enable Kurds to acquire Turkish identity and a sense of state allegiance [5]. Similarly, the Kurdish migration from the Ottoman Empire to southeastern Turkey or alleged Anatolia is controlled by Settlement Act Law No. 2510 [6]. Although many Kurds have been scattered across the nation, no exact amount is available. It was not the sole cause for repeatedly limited relocation in all accounts. In the 1990s, about 3,500 villages and towns were coercively vacated by the State, removing around 3,500,000 Kurds and others from its territory. The Kurdish people have become acclimated to Turkish but have fewer chances to speak solely in Kurdish via restricted movement and migration. The active participation of this government in the dispersion of Kurds in the southeastern areas may well be viewed as intent on Kurdish linguistics because of the intentional stifling of any growth and development of the Kurdish Language.

4.   Realization of Kurdish and Newroz

During the 20th century, many Kurdish events highlighted the distinctions in the identity of the Kurdish people's groupings and asserted their rightful claim to self-government. The coup (1982) led to the Kurdish Workers Party forming a rising assembly of student movements. Included the development of the Karker Party (PKK), headed by Abdullah Calan. Calan was an advocate for illegal student performances throughout his undergraduate years, particularly after his seven months in imprisonment in 1971. It became liberal and rational communism, and the reality of reason substituted religion [7]. As with other advancements, education and literacy affect people's understanding of certain values, such as the various treatments of ethnic groups within a nation and their identity.

Again, the PKK creation was an effort to attain some kind of autonomy and Kurdish national identity. Meanwhile, Kurdish unity existed little; Calan was meant to build it by calling for the Kurds to be unjustified, particularly their rejection of privileges and support for linguistic and cultural rights. The unique Kurdish Language and culture of Turkish was a tactic for promoting this unity.

The rise of the PKK made the Kurdish ethnic struggle a global war and eroded the cultural and physical frontiers of previous tribal groups. In every attempt to get broad support, individuals must be involved via shared understandings and qualities that legitimize, enhance and strengthen collective action [8]. The PKK developed a Kurdish national identity with shared conceptions of a basic family line, a region, history, Language, and past achievements. The Newroz convention, which means "New Day," is one celebration of the PKK. In the mid-1990s, the Turkish state acknowledged this occasion as a national holiday, renaming it 'Nevruz' because of the lack of q, x and w in sequence in Turkish letters and limiting it to 2013. Irvine and Gal argue for the ionization idea, in which letters are linked with a social and linguistic group; this leads to the elimination of a language at any time when the Language or letters are outlawed [9]. The modification to The Invention of Tradition is a consequence of the "ascendence and fear of Kurdish patriotism, which were both challenging the authority of the state." As Hobsbawm says, governments build the traditions surrounding terrible events to establish links with the past. The Turkish state presented this as an old Turkish Festival. The action of the Turkish state also provided a chance to build deeper links with the reverent Newroz post-Soviet Turkish nations. The purpose of this particular occasion was to distinguish between Newroz and the Kurds by identifying the state authorities as a 'Turkish' custom. Since the Kurds considered it their difference from Turkey, ethnicity, and traditions, the Kurdish patriotism tried to stop this separation. For example, Demirel (the President of Turkey) stated in 1996 to Newroz that "mostly the populations who celebrate Nevruz are of Turkish heritage." If different groups share a common progenitor and a common history, fraternity and togetherness are suggested.

5. The Use of Kurdish

In her book on Kurdish Protest and Politics in Turkey, Nicole Watts [10] stressed that while Kurdish in Turkey is not recognized, Kurdish is extensively used in the Southeast, including legitimate political settings. She noticed that civic leaders of regions often interact daily with Kurds in these places [10]. According to the President of Diyarbakir, one aim of the state was to eradicate the Kurdish Language and culture. The ability to speak Kurdish openly, in the open day and in official situations, is one of the indicators of peace. It was also essential to restore the connection between the area and the population. It was addressed in Kurdish during conferences, concerts, and festivals and promoted in Kurdish and Turkish via printed materials. It happened despite Turkish law requiring all businesses to be in Turkish in 2009. Regional law grew vaguer, which obliged Turkish to be a "formal business," but permitted municipal usage of other languages regarding connection, when necessary.

This measure has been attempted by pro-Kurdish politicians in some places - particularly Diyarbakir. Research by Watts shows that the limitation of the Kurdish Language does not impede the speaking of the Kurdish Language, even in legislative offices. One may look to current studies of the Kurdish Language regularly to show the criticality of a language. A recent effort, for example, has highlighted the significance of Language to Turkish and Kurdish young people in Turkey. The Youth Turks Speak Out: Oral History Role for Turkey's 2011/2012 Initiative Leyla Neyzi is filled with talks between young Turks and Kurds in two major metropolitan Turks.

The project results showed the vastly different experiences had by the same age individuals living in a similar city. Leyla Neyzi (director of the Zaman newspaper) also emphasized the importance of Language in the many contacts between Turkish and Kurdish young people: The Language, characteristic of Kurds, is significant. It's a glimpse of something larger, but people become upset when listening to Kurdish music or speaking Kurdish. Speaking in Kurdish thus becomes a subject of controversy [11]. This experiment shows how speaking in another language affects the global identity and viewpoint of a person. As a result of the segregation of Kurds, and Turks in Turkey live in separate languages. A group of respondents described their problems when they began school and could not communicate in Turkish. Others chastened Turks since Kurdish was seen more as a language than as a dialect.

6. Political Side (Regulation and practice of Kurdish)

According to Article 81 of the Turkish Constitution (law 2820), ideological groups cannot affirm minorities in Turkey. Moreover, protecting or establishing non-Turkish populations or languages is not illegal. Before 2011, political candidates might risk prison time during a campaign to speak Kurdish. Between 2002 and 2007, a one-year jail sentence for communicating in Kurdish during political campaigns was imposed on five government workers. During rallies, they talked in Kurdish to the public since a portion of the group could not understand them. When this issue came before the ECHR, judges found that Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to free speech, was being broken by the Turkish Constitutional Court. While nations have established their language policies and have been able to regulate language usage during political competitions, a clear prohibition on the use, along with criminal sanctions, of informal languages was incompatible with freedom of speech. Given the absence of communications on Kurdish at political rallies in these candidates who had not already been chosen for officials, the conviction of government officials was deemed illegal. The outcome of this lawsuit was an amending of the provisions on political competitions and a clear definition of the languages to be utilized. New regulations for marketing in languages other than Turkish are being laid out since 2011 [12]. The ECHR's judgments are mainly responsible for this achievement. The new legislation, particularly for politicians, provided that more people in Turquía could be closer to each other and that Language would be eliminated as an obstacle

for the candidate to connect with voters. However, another regulation was adopted, which restricted the influence of political organizations to 10%. Although the presence of a Kurdish language may be not affected by these requirements, it does affect the admission of organizations to Parliament and, therefore, the modification of additional regulations. A high 10% barrier precludes, for example, the accession to this Parliament of regional parties, pro-Kurdish organizations and several other groups. For instance, five small parties (2002) with a rate of over 5% have been refused admission; a total of 45% of votes have been nullified because no one in their ideological group has been allowed. Therefore, the threshold of the 18 candidate parties, the CHP (19%) and the AKP (34%), was surpassed by two of the 18, showing that just a portion of the democratic people is in the Parliament [13]. This obstacle is not only a barrier to pro-Kurdish groups.

In addition, the bulk of gatherings that remain pro-Kurdish political organizations were prohibited by some radical Islamist parties. The Parliament is less truly representative as this outcome of the elections since the AKP (2002) won 66% of the MPs and only got 33% of the votes. Since the 10% threshold was established, several government officials have complained about the high level of obstruction and stressed the efforts of Turkey to reduce this. Nevertheless, this proposal has frequently been rejecting by Erdogan (President of Turkey).

The declaration indicates that Erdogan is rejecting the new parliamentary parties. As most ideological parties do, he simply needs to guarantee that his party maintains power and wins more seats. As many newspapers examine the 10% political impediments, it is obvious that all ideological parties, save the AKP, are against these impediments. It is hardly unexpected since this standard is most beneficial to the AKP. This level continued to hinder further views throughout the presidential elections in 2014-15. For example, although Erdogan is obliged, as President of the nation, to be a non-fanatic [14], in the 2015 election, he kept promoting the AKP Party. Regardless of the situation, there was a dangerous parliament following the election results in 2015 that no coalition could form, and the re-elections are quite sure.

Due to a different presidential context, the AKP party used the Kurdish Language widely for political purposes, including the formation of a campaign song in Kurdish and the distribution of posters in Kurdish across the whole eastern and southeastern Turkey (2014) the first presidential elections of Turkey [15]. The candidates of the AKP explain in a separate article why they chose to campaign with the Kurdish pennants: it's a local political competition [16]. We (AK Party) reasoned that it was the right course of action to use the Language known by the Diyarbakir people. We have thus chosen to show our posters in Kurdish, Zaza and Turkish. These are the languages we need to master. Until recently, different languages were considered to convey fear, isolation, and separatism; they no longer exist. The statement's conclusion maybe two important: firstly, the Kurdish Language is seen as a local rather than a state language, and secondly, there is a difference between the

languages in use at that time and those used now. At the same time, in the Kurdish, there were significant campaigns by HDP/BDP in favour of the Kurdish ideological organization, but the MHP and CH Panels did not. Although it seems that the MHP is not interested in any political class promoting the Language of Kurdish, since its belief system is mostly about increasing Turkish culture, one of the eastern urban districts of Turquie (2011), there was an MHP candidate. He said that although he did not have a Kurdish political campaign, he communicates with Turkish people and, at times, with Kurdish ones [17]. Because the MHP is an organization of Turkish genius, this model may mean that a Turkish legislator has investigated Kurdish for political reasons. In any case, given the relative obscurity of the Language, it is impossible to determine how many Turks want to study Kurdish. It should be mentioned that in 2010 the Kemalist party proposed that political campaigning in Kurdish be permitted even if it did not appear independently [18].

In addition to electoral campaigns, political leaders promote or utilize the Kurdish Language in many cases. A doubting incident took place in 2013 when the Turkish Prime Minister gave a speech in Diyarbakir [19]. He was accompanied by two Turkish-Kurdish singers and the leader of Iraq's self-governing Kurdish region on stage. In the first running, a Turkish prime minister addressed the Kurdish singers at a meeting that showed his respect for the Language. In this context, it appeared to be of special symbolic importance in the history of Turkey. However, there is evidence that this conference had been organized in several ways, including building an oil pipeline that links the autonomous area of Iraq with Turkey [20]. Iraqi Kurdistan has oil resources; Turkey may profit from a peaceful solution with the Kurds while working with Iraqi Kurds in Turkey. Whatever the legitimacy of the thought processes, the Turkish Executive has done so without parallel in the history of Turkish modernity. Two significant facts become obvious when one analyses the laws regulating elections in Kurdish. Firstly, development allows for the growth and use of the Language via Kurdish free marketing. The second needs the first to utilize the Kurdish Language accurately. The Kurdish language is not encouraged or preserved for its intrinsic worth or durability but an unpleasant obligation. To exercise influence over Kurdish, the Turkish state and lawmakers utilize the Language for one purpose: re-election. In any case, this is a tremendous accomplishment since it shows that the pro-Kurdish side, in particular, can connect successfully with future voters and engage in them. Many records of the 2015 Southeast election constantly reported Kurdish, and sometimes the political occasions/talks delivered by political up-comers were eclipsed by Kurdish. The vast majority of these recordings are online, like Facebook, known as the "Kurdish Network Studies," with university and friends talking about Kurdish studies.

7. Role in Education (Kurdish)

The Language of education plays an important part in the achievement of students in school. Language, according to experts, is frequently the main cause of the low performance of minority

students. The public role in dominant languages is defined by Suzanna Romaine (2000) [26] as follows: As one of the main instruments of society, schools are excellent at controlling their students. It respects the values and languages of the traditional and middle classes. Kids who do not come to school will very likely suffer from the anticipated linguistic and cultural background. It applies even to children of ordinary labourers linked to mainstream culture but much more to the descendants of foundations of ethnic minorities [21]. In 2003, in line with the requirements of EU membership, a proposal for courses in Kurdish was prepared. A few private Kurdish teaching courses have been created in large urban areas like Istanbul. In any case, these courses are terminated due to a lack of financing, despite the explicit need for Kurdish courses under EU law. The state was responsible for including these courses, which caused a dispute over the presence of language classes. The strict restrictions of the Turkish state for closing down Kurdish courses. Classes may last ten weeks, 18 hours a week, and may only be adult. Teachers must be Turkish native speakers; students must pay a large price to meet strict requirements, and public money should not be granted to private courses. Zeydanlioglu [1] sees these stringent constraints as an illustration of how Turkish experts have obeyed the word but not the spirit of EU law to guarantee few Kurdish courses are provided. This linguistic strategy was intended to prevent the development and completion of the Kurdish Language course. Zeydanlioglu stated in this regard that state officials might prove that Kurds are unable to master their Language [1]. These limitations also harm children because adults were allowed to participate in these courses exclusively. However, students had to finish a Turkish education for eight years before taking private Kurdish classes.

Penguin said it might seem a disappointment and suggest a lack of enthusiasm from the Kurdish speakers to conclude the individual instruction. However, once the projects were finished, the course enrolled 1,179 students [2]. Finally, once they were completed, the proposals were not overlooked. The Kurdish protestors started a massive campaign for Kurdish education, which brought tens of thousands of petitions to parliament. Mater (2002) reports that experts reacted to this action by arresting many students who appeared in breach of Article 169 for supporting the unlawful organization. The EU releases an annual report on the applicants detailing the nation's activities and its compliance with the EU's legislation, such as the safeguarding of human rights and the rule of law. It has not authorized any legal sanctions for its abuse of its people against Turkey. Or maybe there is an opinion that Turkey should be prevented from joining the EU as long as it continues to limit freedom of speech and violate human rights [22]. The progress and attitudes towards Kurdish show that more efforts and assistance are needed to standardize Kurdish.

8. Conclusion

This article analyzed Turkish language arrangements from the establishment of modern Turkey and their impact on the use and status of the Kurdish Language by the general people. With the creation of

Turkey, the entirety of the century elucidates the roots of Kurdish. The article showed the role of the government in creating and setting up a state based on Turkish standards. In particular, the state's restrictive policies have affected the growth of the Turks and the Kurds. When the ten-year Kurdish prohibition has been understood, the revival of Kurdish in the 21st century is simpler to evaluate via the creation of Kurdish courses for political campaigns in different educational areas. Actual and genuine data from newspapers have been used to illustrate the Kurdish language usage for the modern era. The varied perspectives of ideological groups' Kurdish language teaching showed the degree of resistance to the Kurdish Language of each ideological group. While education helps young people, politics addresses older people and how they can guarantee the Kurdish language's survival. The most interesting conclusions of this study were how education had a role in spreading the prevailing perspective on the Turkish Language during the first half of the 20th century. It was amazing to find out that just a small proportion of the people were responsible for the end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of modern Turkey. Arabic and Latin did not vary in substance as much as one might anticipate. The educated global elite enforced strict rules on the newly created state with a top-down strategy that highlighted modernity, secularism and a single country like European countries. As Language allows the state to influence human behaviour and build communities based on a defined identity, as stated in speeches made by Kemal Atatürk and others, Language strategies were a key component of the country's functioning. Although this article focuses on Kurdish language policy in the Turkish state, the survival of languages goes beyond semantic rights. An increasing Kurdish population remains unsolved with wider problems for a minority. More than ethnic phonetic effects may be seen in the Kurdish question. In this paper, the division between the Turkish and Kurdish populations is exacerbated by differing financial gains in the Turkish Kurdish region. Women were barred from those tribes from literate and profitable professions, but their high proportion of analphabetism contributed to the oral survival of Kurds. In many west and East Turkey, greater equivalency should be sought, other than mutual recognition and understanding between Turks and Kurds. Expanding open practises and understanding of the Kurdish culture and Language may also lead the Kemalist-based Turkish culture to search for a fairer method of turning Turkey into a new common identity, which welcomes cultural and linguistic diversity. In any case, as the article quickly states, the continuous admission into the Turkish House of pro-Kurdish ideological parties shows that it is possible to preserve the Turkish Language and cultural variety.

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