



### US-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT

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**Abstract:** Due to the competing views and strategy persuasions, ties between the US and China have seen many ups and downs. Chinese movements in the South Pacific Rim are currently regarded as a risk to the area's US interests. This has resulted in the US to change its political allegiance to the Pacific region. As the Pacific Ocean becomes crucial owing to its trade and investment paths, China has also moved its attention to the Oceanic relations in order to reach strategic value. In the South China Sea conflict, it is in the country's interest of China not to fight America militarily, because it would have massive costs with small advantages. China's fast economic development, growing industry, and military modernization have resulted in the US to imagine China as a significant rival and not a reliable partner as a contender.

Keywords: US China, South China, Sea, Conflict

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### 1. Introduction

In the twentieth century, economic development and assets were priorities for the hegemons, but in the twenty-first century, global politics overturned geo-economics in which globalization didn't work without global politics. In the 21st century, water and sea routes are as crucial as land in the 19th and 20th centuries. The 21st century also provided a center stage in world politics for oceans and naval resources, thus altering the conventional notion of dominance. In the age of globalization, the U.S. faces threat from several major powers like Russia, Japan, Germany, and China, which present a crucial risk to U.S. dominance and question their superpower status. On the other side, China has a lot of land disputes with its neighboring countries like Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan. In the area in which China claims unquestionable independence, there are many shake-points and water routes. With its partnership scheme in the Pacific region, the US dominates the area and the area's loss of US forces would damage its hegemonic stance. Thereby, South China Sea Chinese strategies are viewed as safety risk to the Pacific area's U.S. dominance this research paper thus attempts to analyze the dispute of the US-China over the South China Sea through historical allegations, counterstrategies, and feasible future perspectives and their consequences for the area in the context of ground realities.

### 2. Theoretical background

Many academics have looked at the transitional eye of United States. -China relations. Contrary to the global unipolar scheme of the United States, China believes that a multipolar international order would be a stronger strategy for achieving global peace. Achieving and maintaining authority is the key point of ties between the two nations. Several ideas of international affairs have addressed control factors like traditional pragmatists; Waltz and Morgenthau believe that "Struggle for Power" drives the behavior of the state. (Griffiths, 2007) Whenever a country achieves a strong position, it attempts to raise it and safeguard it in the global system by distinct means, "Countries have encountered one another in authority contests." (Morgenthau, 1976) Organski has developed the theory of energy transformation, which overrides the notion of hegemonic theory of stabilization. He claims that such energy process (achieving, expanding, and retaining) creates countries unhappy, and the international order is made up of one superpower and several major powers in which the global power is always threatened by the growing revisionist challenger.

Organski said that in his effort to dislodge the decreasing hegemon, "conflict is likely to be instigated by a quicker expanding upstart." (Ronald Tammen, 2000) Control Transformation Theory's fundamental reasoning explains the point that war is looming if a supplementary major power approaches a hegemon and controversy is prominent between highest-ranked energy and the challenger. The contender will always be a revisionist and an unhappy major power whose increase will disrupt the state of affairs of the global system. The theory claims that "the risk of a major conflict occurs when an 'unsatisfied' strength overcomes a global dictator, vice versa when a 'satisfied' authority is destined to supplant that dictator, this risk can be avoided." (Chan, 2004) In the 21st century, China is highly unhappy with the current world order as it favors the multipolar international order and represents a threat to the expansionist US. The concept of authority transformation predicts that there may be confrontation between countries that have no culture of closeness. The US has powerful connections with Brazil, Germany, and India, as well as with Russia to a certain point. These powerful countries are not very capable of overruling the dominance of the U.S. as they rely heavily on the United States military or financially. But China with the capacity to change the global system can change the situation of the US; if not the whole scheme, however certainly in the area of East Asia. (Yiwei, 2008)

The 21st century is the century of globalization and financial interdependence, and its economic development measures the authority of nations. In the Pacific, China, with its naval strategies, challenges US dominance via its army development and economic expansion. By geographically encircling China and enhancing its economic and military connections with neighboring nations, the US is attempting to combat this danger. With all its powerful financial impact on South Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, China is questioning United States stance and the key issue in the Pacific region that can influence China South China Sea, in which China is improving its statement to territorial integrity, is the main competing naval region in the Pacific Ocean. The difficulty of the relationship between the United States and China in the East Asian area is well demonstrated by conflicts over sea lanes and sea boundaries and jurisdiction. The South China Sea is becoming a significant center for exchange and shipping, and the global economy depends on the free exchange of trade across the sea. As the center of Mackinder in the twentieth century, the South China Sea in the twenty-first century became a core of waters and oceans, and controlling this region would describe controlling global economy and global politics.

### **3. The South China Sea**

The Global Hydrologic Department describes the South China Sea as "the border between Southwest-Northwest and South-West," and "Taiwan is the western boundary between the western tip of Taiwan and Fukien." The South China Sea is 3,500,000 square kilometers (Djalal, 1990). The South China Sea is the south boundary, with the western boundary running from the western tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast in China." The region is rich in resources and geo strategically important to trade and businesses and is a zone of small islands, rocks and islets. It is one of the most popular trade routes in the world. The Pacific Ocean is connected to the Indigenous Ocean as a parallel between the two major oceans. The South China Sea area comprises 250 small islands, mainly in the Spratly

and Parcel Archipelagos and contested by six neighboring countries, namely China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. The countries in question have claims for the two major archipelagos of Spratly and Parcel. Parcel Island has a gross land area of 10 square Km and an ocean area of between 15,000 and 16,000 square Km. Although Spratly is the most important and challenged area that connects the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean and its islands, the Spratly archipelago is small, with no housing. It occupies almost 160,000 to 180,000 km<sup>2</sup> of sea area. The Spratly Archipelago is home to twelve key islands, while 390 reefs, bays and banks are islands. (Switzerland, 14 May 2014)

The islands are 400 nautical miles from east to west as well as other features, and 500 nautical miles from north to south. 38% of the South China Sea region falls within the Spratly Archipelago. From China and west to Philippines, the geographical area stretches south into Indonesia and Singapore.

The northeast region of Malaysia and Brunei. On the south China Sea side, it is in the northeast of the East China Sea where China has a dispute with Japan, while it borders the Indian Ocean, the largest center in the world for trade, and the global economy is dependent on certain trade routes in the east and west. For major authorities like the United States in the 21st century, this South China Sea geopolitical region has made it important to stimulate their initiatives from neutrality to their "core interest" (Cronin, January 2012)

#### **4. The interests and objectives of the United States**

As a world-wide powerhouse, the United States must preserve the status quo and secure from any nation in the Pacific that is challenging and in which Chinese policies and autonomy demands on most islands challenge its importance. The US is a big financial player in the region and may challenge China's goals in questioning its economies. The United States and China are not in a zero-sum match and are familiar about each other's policies and tactics.

Secondly, the US' policies and priorities are part of the "Global Commons" (Pedrozo, 2013) definition, which preserves its military participation in regions of shared concern and its interests from the imminent threat. The world's major economies, particularly the United States and China. Third, the US aims to acquire the capacity to escape an expanding authority or some combination of powers that threatens their economic supremacy in the area of eastern Asia. In the US, one of the key pillars of US strategy is the uni-polarity and the avoidance of any uni-polarity issue. Fourth, the aim is to ensure the protection of the markets and to reduce the likelihood of barriers disrupting access to these routes in different trading lines across the world. The fundamental US solution, thus, lies in the interests of navigational independence in the event of the South China Sea. The American National Interest Study 2000, addressing questions of America in the friendly settlement of the South China Sea dispute and Notes 'US direct interest in the conflict over the South China Sea requires the preservation of stability, freedom of travel and compliance, including the UN Convention on the Imposed South China, describes the interests of the Americas (Crownin, January 2012) The United States' The US is a dominant player in air, sea and land, but Chinese naval tactics challenge its superiority in the 21st century, and America's view of the danger pushes it to believe from effective neutrality to effective defense.

#### **5. China's interests and goals**

Chinese concern in the 21st century, explained by Through John Heming, can represent China's readiness to take hold, to disseminate an effective impact in waters and commercial ways of tremendous strategic significance to support financial growth, and its ability to plan this by using military force. Chinese concerns can be represented in the 21st century.

The first is boundaries defence, impacting its appraisal of the risk to US annexation policies for East Asia. China has three main operational priorities. Following the incidents on Tiananmen Square (1989) which resulted in worsening interactions between the USA and China, China is highly concerned with the possibility of US deterrence and invasion. (Mirski, 2013) Local stability is the second target and China's economic development will be assured by regional economic success. China is more concerned about asset protection due to its financial and population growth. The demand for energy supply has grown with economic growth. China aims at an uninterrupted condition in the entry of properties. It is not only because the South China Sea is a rich asset zone, but because it is a fundamental link to the core asset fields of the globe, especially the Indian Ocean, Middle East and Africa. Roughly 80% of the power supplies in China flow via the South China Sea. (Vaughn, 4 April 2006) Chinese naval authorities agree that the United States will use its naval authority to endanger the Chinese trade in the Southeast Asian region. The key thing that makes these two countries dissatisfied is the risk-taking perspective from the ability of one another to compare China and the United States' priorities. Encircling and counter-circling strategies are developed by establishing good ties around China's borders. But while the maritime zone is viewed as a key area of interest, the two countries rely on measures that will empower them without damaging international order. (Vaughn, April 4, 2006)

## **6. Claims about the Sea of South China**

There are two facets of the allegations, one of which discusses the issue of the relations between the coastal nations of the South China Sea: the claim for autonomy and one the maritime area in which territorial and Chinese waters are central. The new South China Sea War nevertheless is in the interests of major powers, where Chinese arguments clash with the US's worries regarding the freedom of navigation and the open seas. The United States is committed to the free entry to the South China Sea, a vital connection between both the Pacific and the Indian oceans. (Lu, 1989) The two islands of Paracell and Sprattly have completed independence in China and Vietnam, while 8 islands in the Sprattly Archipelago have the Philippines. The Philippine's claim on the South China Sea is evident in the Philippine president's first formal declaration in 1950 that any interference by Sprattly's adversary would be perceived as a danger to Philippine security. At the San Francisco conference, the Vietnamese claim was clarified and based on the autonomy of Paracell and Sprattly. (GyoKo, 2010) If Chinese sailors were captured in a crescent party in South Vietnam in 1974, Chinese protestation began to be such that the "Hsisha territories are portion of China's terrestrial." was explicitly broken in Chinese sovereignty and integrity (Series, 1978)

The Chinese claim is based on the cultural right of the islands, since China was the one to explore and exploit these islands. This statement reveals China's political planning that the land belonging to China should never be claimed by a foreign country. The first formal declaration of the Chinese assertion to historic rights was made by Chinese leader Zhou Enlai in the year 1951 who said that the history to Paracell and Sprattly was "dated back to the Sungg Dyynasty." (Lu, 1989). In 1980, the Chinese Foreign Minister discussed China's undisputed autonomy over much of the Xishaa and Nanssha Islands, which obviously explain the argument of the Chinese that the Xissha and Nanssha Island were China's nation since ancient times, and which is proven by legally binding facts... The Vietnamese officials' illegitimate invasion. It can represent only to demonstrate its ethnic aggressors and tyrannies. There is no doubt about China's autonomy through the islands of Xisha and Naansha" (Kivimak, 2002)

With respect to the situation of the United States in the Southern China Seas, it has little overt involvement in the autonomy dispute but implicitly strengthens the conflict in order to establish the economic and political interests of the United States. In the 1950s and 1960s, China perceived the risk of indirect U.S. participation instantly and China, unlike the Philippines and Vietnamese prerogatives." (Kivimak, 2002)

## **7. The South China Sea Policy of the US**

The US has adopted the East Asian approach to countering and achieving the Chinese threat. The United States recognizes that aggression and a clear commitment would harm its presence in this area and could damage stability in the whole region, when not just China and the USA, but all big global program, need to be concerned with the Southern China Sea. The United States has built its strategy to deter Chinese influence by creating a collaborative environment. As far as totalitarianism is concerned, China has been the main rival in the South China Sea and has taken the form of the USSR. Historically, the US is not worried about disputes about island freedom, but is concerned about the innocent implementation of these waters, which might place China at risk if they become completely independent of most parts of the South China Sea in the near future. The United States has three major policies: avoidance, practice and deterrence; whether the Pacific region needs to protect its importance. (April 4, 2006) Vaughn.

It is avoided to protect the US worry about "free navigation" In China's anti-hegemonic efforts and the present shifting situation, the US employs preventive strategy to improve its financial and security ties with Southeast Asian nations. Disarmament is to avoid the future danger from regional domination. In the United States in 1995. Deputy Defense Secretary Joseph Nye stated: "military intervention is taking place in the South China Sea... we will be complete to accompany and ensure that navigation continues." (Yiwei 2008) In order to accomplish this goal and ban China's hegemonic ambition, the U.S. is using its military core to occupy Japan, South Korea and the Contra. Similar to 10,000 soldiers were deployed from the US to the area. The military bases of the United States and its involvement in Eastern Asia strengthen the view of China about the threat. America is enhanced by strategic collaboration with the Philippines, which aims to create a total safeguard against the future danger to military infrastructure. Technique is the third likely solution, which implies last resort usage of power. The last option for the US to keep its meaning intact would become the norm if avoidance and retribution fail.(Vaughn, April 4, 2006)

## **8. The strategy for hedging**

If the US wants to stabilize its authority in the Asia-Pacific region, it must increase its military existence in the area. The United States took a hedging strategy, believing that China has a strategic competence in the Asia Pacific region for the Americas. This strategy is constructive in the management of Chinese ability and balance of balance. Taking the US as an overseas stabilizer in East Asia into account, its future-oriented scheme has inspired East Asia to tackle it. Although the USA has clear military connectedness with the Philippines, it is justified in many South-East Asian nations, the Philippines and Thailand for reliable defense. (Joichiro-Cooney, 2008)

In 1995, the armed forces relations between the USA and the Philippines have been restored after China annexed the notorious Sprattly island Pallawan. The US-Philippines relations are influenced by a broader state by security assistance that influences the politics of a lower world. (Giorgil Gvalia, (2013) Whenever he felt less likely to contend with the Chinese police, the Philippines transferred details to the Americas. America seeks to manipulate the Philippine initiatives and judge the dispute over the South China Sea by overruling and suppressing the Chinese impact of the Philippines.

The United States has started support for defense services in the Philippines such as Navy's Coast Watch South Programmed, which is meant for radar systems and frequency equipment for the Philippine navy. (Vaughn, 4 April 2006) In 2008, Mindanao conducted a Joint Complete Training. In 2009, the United Nations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gattes visited the Philippines to explore the topics of concern and ensure the construction of a strong Philippine army. The 2012 stalemate between China and the Philippines leads the US into the Philippines and the Philippines, as China does not want foreign intervention, tackling the international tribunal's dilemma that gathered hostile reactions from China. The U.S. aims at making this relationship a sanctuary from China. all these activities are linked. China has changed its strategic mode for cooperation in the fight against the US in response to American approaches. In establishing an intertwined financial situation, China has launched the "No String Program" to separate the US from its relationship framework. (April 4, 2006) Vaughn.

China is trying to develop an industrialized market with a Chinese-centered accord, reducing the US influence from East Asian countries and hostile neighboring countries such as South Korea, Japan, India and Philippines. As a US entrance strategy to the edge of Chinese tactical interests in the Pacific region, China regarded the US-Philippine relations and military cooperation. China has employed the lenient approach to controls and developed worthy financial relations with the South-East Asian states in view of the US strategy as risk. Economic agreements between China and the Philippines were strengthened, with a 33.3 percent improvement in 2006. (Bergsten, Gill, Lardy, and Mitchel, I. (2006), and 2006). In 2004, Philippine Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz and the Chinese Defense Secretary reached an agreement and secured a process to move the armed forces and consult them to resolve both the common threat of nuclear war and other domestic security problems. And in 2007, in the Philippines, the Chinese authorities promised protection assistance. (December 2009) Castro

Chinese strategic strategy was analyzed and China's "Charm Aggressive" style was discussed by Brendan Coley, which gave him an understanding of the need to remediate its relation to East Asian countries. China is trying to strengthen its financial influence in the region through its economic and cultural contribution. It also strengthens military coordination with some countries in East Asia to keep them from going to the US<sup>37</sup>. China has grown overall since 2008 by 20% to \$193 billion in 2008 and US trades with ASEAN by 181 billion dollars in 2008. In 2008, the gross exchange rate for the US has risen. Notwithstanding neighborhood tensions, China's key objective is to develop friendly trade relations for complete integration with these countries. Mountain selection, Gill, Lardy, & Mitchel.

Once the Philippines intercepted 8 Chinese ships in a 125 kilometer area of the Philippines continent and unveiled one of them bearing reefs and live sharks unlawfully, the China-Philippines stalemate has escalated once again (2012); the Philippines has eliminated them by Chinese supervision. The Philippines went closer to the US after this altercation, while U.S. troops exercised armed drills close the mountain. The U.S. is seeking to expand the U.S. alliance, and almost permanent camps flourish around the coast of Mindanao. In the Philippines, the United States has a joint special unit in Jolo and Sulu, where troops are rotatingly implemented in the United States. The US life of Mindanao is situated geographically in the southwestern South China Sea. In combination with military exercises, the US is building high infrastructure units in the Philippines and is establishing a joint security center. The sites are capable of handling the US deployment in the Asia Pacific. (Castro, December 2009)

## **9. Chinese ' Denial Strategy for Access**

For the interests of national security, China believes that its safety objectives and interests can only be achieved by means of impact in the fields around its periphery. To this end, China has used the "non-Access" or "Zone Rejection" approach by installing its monitoring system over its shore.<sup>41</sup> China's geo political opinion that it requires strategic value in its territorial waters to curb US invasion in East Asia is powerful in its initiatives. This is why China is reinforcing its assertion over the disputed islands of the South China Sea and has released a further chart with 10 lane dividers through the Sino map that shows its overwhelming and powerful assertion over island of Taiwan and the west coast of the Philippines. (Malik, 2013)

In addition to the operating philosophy, China has embraced a policy for military modernization. China's military approach is aimed at the counter-access approach by which China can prevent future US safety dangers. China faces menaces from the modernization of the Philippines ' defense, Indian presence, and US concern in the area's South East Asian area and its aircraft carriers. This can only be addressed by the Chinese grand strategy, (Kien & Yu, 2003) that comprises of the "Island Chain Philosophy" system of geopolitical control of the country. For this, China is attempting to switch the zone through 2 cables; one from its coastline passes between southern Japan and Indo-China, whilst the other passes between east Indo-China and Japan. China were using armed force

twice; on the Archipelago of Paracell in 1974, whenever it captured the crescent organization, whilst on the Sprattly Islands in 1988, whenever it captured the Johnson. China was able to overcome the whole South China Sea, creating nine crossed lines showing its assertion to autonomy in the South China Sea. The aim of China's non-access and rejection of entry strategy is to prohibit US activity to its outskirts, as this one anti-ship cruise arms are capable of operating and targeting the entire South China Sea. (Kien & Yu, 2003) China is also seeking a dissuasive approach to limit usa update the Chinese marine, air and ground powers with heavy-tech and military hardware. (Vaughn, April 4, 2006)

## **10. South China Sea Future: Conflict Management or Escalation of Conflict?**

The fundamental issue occurs in these contrasting opinions and policies whether or not dispute over the South China Sea can be regulated? The 1st and probably most important option is to settle disputes by reciprocal or multilateral means and by means of processes for resolving conflict. But for the Chinese and finish goal, this choice is not appropriate. Chinese people need to solve the problem by means of customary law because their assertion is based on previous law. In 2009, China posted to the UN its' Nine dashed line' claim. In addition, the dispute settlement process has also fail on a local site such as ASEAN. China's ancient right argument is powerful enough considers that land of China can never be provided back. The ASEAN conferences and the Code of practice for the South China Sea have also failed to bring a dispute settlement process to the South China Sea that has no enforcement power. (Castro, December 2009)

Second, there are two equations for the Chinese conflict alternative: confronting the USA direct or indirect via dispute with lesser US allies such as the Philippines or Vietnam. The Philippines has powerful military connections with the US, and China must believe that it does not compete with the Philippines, but also with the strength of the US. China must lose its picture of a pro-status quo force via military conflict and contest the area's U.S. dominance. China may have real presence over the alleged regions, however this profit is unclear as the Sprattly is distant from the Chinese central, and it is also enormously hazardous for Chinese safety. To use soft power and soft way of achieving the ultimate objective is the third and best decision with heavy advantage and low price. Whereas it will takings some time to achieve the required goals of regional integrity, China can dominate the impact of the U.S from the Pacific thru financial dependence. China cannot achieve the goal of physicality, but it can make use of the South China Sea's maximum output.

States in the conflict compete for fair resource allocation and seek economic development alternatively. They must also boost their defense spending thru competition and dispute. As significant states ' defense spending increases, the economic development t will mechanically redact. It is in the best interest of the South China Sea's lesser countries to create a decision that did not hinder the South China Sea's interest in financial growth and asset allocation. The best option is economic co-operation with significant economies. Economically and militarily safety based on China will automatically harm the US economic system. As the China's economy expands, the US economy and trade are declining, with the consequence that the international order may alter.

## **11. Implications of the conflict in the South China Sea**

The coming years of interactions between the US and China depends on the upcoming of the South China Sea war. The process for handling conflicts looks ambiguous and it may lead to intensification. Consequences of the distinguished conflict are:

- China's use of power will have catastrophic impacts on ties between China and the United States. A significant US-China conflict will encourage Japan as well as other South East Asian countries not to stay neutral. Military confrontation will also destroy America's "one China strategy" assistance.
- In the absence of a response to Chinese aggressiveness, the position of the US in the West Pacific area

- The U.S. participation in the dispute will worsen the two countries, China and the U.S., because the association under apprehension will end specifically and a straightforward rivalry will arise in the form of a fresh Cold War.
- Chinese assertions over the Island will lead to a conflict between China and the United States, the two main rivals and big players. As Chinese are rigid if it comes to their land, this will threaten the entire global system.
- The Chinese restriction of the unshaped border marks obviously the Chinese regional expanding aspirations. China can restrict U.S. exchange through such a development. Occupying Sprattly and Paracell will offer China a boost to restrict its territorial waters border, 12 naval miles from the U-shaped line showing the South China Sea as the China Sea, over which China has whole switch and China can allow external forces to relocate to its land.
- If China wins in influencing the lower applicant in the conflict, the global system will shift from unipolarity to bipolar disorder in which China will be a different force in the global scheme.
- China becomes the only regional force at national scale and override the America ' totalitarian stance.

## 12. Conclusion

In the 21st century, the South China Sea is becoming a hot spot and a direct measure of the global program's power politics. The hypothesis that the country dominating the South China Sea will affect the globe is worth noting. The South China Sea confrontation will contest the totalitarian world power, the United States, for whom value is to dominate the world. As stated in its assertion to Taiwan and Tibet, China's main purpose is to widen its land. Its border dispute in South East Asia extends to the South China Sea and the East China Sea beyond just the island of Taiwan. China enacted Sprattly Island and Paracell Island regional water legislation pretending authority. Underneath the law, China may limit other countries ' navigation for violent reasons. China and the representatives of ASEAN are dedicated by diplomatic means to resolving the problem. The South China Sea, moreover, remains the controversial and harmful region. In the South China Sea conflict, it is in the country's interest of China not to fight American militarily, because it would have massive costs with small advantages.

China has same place that United States held in the Caribbean during the 19th and 20th centuries. As the Spanish-American War of 1898 indicates the departure point for United States domination in the western hemisphere whenever the USA started to dig the Panama Canal. Similarly, China has a wish to safeguard energy resources from the Middle East and the Indian Ocean and to assurance the area's maritime dominant position. After the U.S has obtained a foremost position in the Caribbean, that has become an benefit of its western supremacy, the South China Sea will become the benefit of Chinese domination in Asia and challenge US economic dominance in the same way. This could lead to another cold war, but it would turn the global order from unipolar to bipolar / multipolar, in which competitors like China would compete with the US. As Joseph Nye put it, the international order must be seen with both eyes, via a realistic lens predicting conflict in the transitional stage, and a libertarian lens predicting collaboration as the best method of dealing with the transitional stage of international system.

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