



Energy Strategy of Russia and its Impact on Europe

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Abstract: The impact of Russia's energy policies on Europe is addressed in this article. Russia lost its capable military and defense sector with the collapse of the USSR, which is crucial for its ambition to become a superpower again. This barrier may be erased by using dominance as the main energy source instead of financial power. The establishment of legislative control over the energy sector was a key component of the Russian plan to turn energy assets into a tool of the state's power. All crucial energy transit lines between Russian energy providers and European customers are under the sovereignty of the former Soviet Union's constituent nations. These nations have increased in significance to Russia as intermediaries for the passage of energy. To guarantee a consistent supply of energy and to reduce its dependency on trade nations, Russia is looking for methods to expand the routes through that energy is transported to Europe. Russia is prepared to pay a higher price for the difficult building of new pipelines that cut out intermediaries. A local political hegemony may replace Russia's monopolistic grip over Europe's energy supply. To further Russia's political goals, it may be productive for the state apparatus to sacrifice cost control and the potential for unexpected energy disruption.

Keywords: Russia, European Union, Energy, and Transportation Route

1. Introduction and Background of the study

This article examines how Russia's current foreign policy has changed in connection to the European Union and the many European countries that are becoming increasingly reliant on the Russian energy supply, as well as how Russia's enormous energy potential influences that development. This study aims to assess the European energy market and the degree to which it relies on the Russian energy supply to test the hypothesis that a customer's excessive dependence on a supplier's energy assets may convert those assets into a financial tool of political coercion. The demise of the USSR, which was followed by political and economic unrest, cost Russia a formidable

military force and a thriving defense sector. These two factors are essential to further Russia's goal of regaining its superpower status. Controlling the primary energy source, especially gas, enables economic supremacy to be turned into military superiority, breaking down this barrier. As a result, a crucial element of the Russian plan to use energy assets as a tool of state control was the creation of strong administrative powers over the energy division.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the newly freed governments of the former Soviet republics controlled all key energy transit routes linking European consumers with Russian energy producers. As a result, Moscow's dependence on them as a middleman in the energy transit process greatly grew to maintain Russia's reputation as a trustworthy energy supplier, deliver a steady supply of energy, reduce Russia's reliance on transit countries, and address the issue that has emerged since the stoppage of the gas flow to Europe in 2009. Russia is considering measures to boost the North and South Stream projects' ability to transport electricity to Europe. An approach like this, which connects the buyer and the seller, is probably driven more by politics than profit.

Given that 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe go via transit routes now, Russia is particularly willing to put more money into the challenging building of new pipelines that obviate middlemen. The European Union's disproportionate dependency on Russian energy sources might lead to them having monopolistic control over the flow of a significant quantity of supply to the E.U. Any country inside Russia's area of influence may be asked for their political thoughts, which increases the risk of an unanticipated energy interruption and price control. As a result, economic influence may develop into a formidable tool of state power that successfully furthers political objectives.

2. Literature review

2.1 Economic Dimension

The Russian political initiative had the option to focus and keep up bringing together power and figured out how to discover gigantic public support for its local and worldwide strategy. It was found in the 1990s when Russia was experiencing a stable post-conflict economy. Everyone agrees that what made it possible was the development of a new generation of political leaders who were open-minded and free of Soviet dogma.

One of the key factors guiding Russian foreign policy is the need to provide economic solutions. The economy of Russia is export oriented. Around 85% of its income originates from exporting crude materials, for example, metals, timber, gas, and oil. Russia has around 30% of the world's demonstrated gas stores and 6% of its oil. Moscow's primary fossil-assets buyers are the previous Soviet nations and the lucrative E.U. nations. Since it acquired advanced gas and oil pipeline frameworks from the Soviet Union, Moscow didn't need to put resources into developing energy transportation courses. In the 2000s, Russia figured out how to meet its spending needs rapidly, fundamentally due to the huge decrease in local energy production throughout Europe due to Europe's diminishing hydrocarbon assets and quickly developing energy demand.

In Russia, the two sectors of life are interwoven. During Putin's administration, major industries reverted to state control, and people with close ties to Putin were appointed to protect these economic assets and firms (Dawisha, 2011). The inner circle of Putin and Russian elites turned into those who were his colleagues in the Saint Petersburg city and KGB administration. The individuals selected for high administrative and business places had similar ideas and values that had been formed during the Soviet period. The clearest instance of such an interlaced economic-political relationship is Medvedev (previous Russian president). He worked in Saint Petersburg with Putin.

2.2 Energy replaces military power

Even though the political leadership of Russia figured out how to solidify the populace behind the modern foreign strategy, Moscow is probably not going to satisfy its worldwide desires by utilizing its regular military as the method for power projection; the military of Russia has been in decay in the course of the most recent two decades since the disassembling of the Soviet Union (Hedlund, 2011). Owning one is not the greatest approach to advancing national interests overseas since the best use for an arsenal of atomic bombs would be military preventative measures to maintain the status quo with other military powers (Keohane, 1886). Controlling energy resources might be a powerful political tool and an efficient replacement for military force techniques, supporting the claim made by political pragmatists that the success of the foreign policy depends on the inclusion of power (Goldman, 2010).

Moscow's regular military may promote its national interests overseas and strengthen its influence, as it did in 2008 during the Georgia-Russia war. If so, Russia might gain from its rich resource base, state-of-the-art transportation infrastructure, and advantageous location. These riches might be used by Russia as a potent tool of political and economic power (Zimmerman, 2013), particularly in Europe, which is the biggest lucrative exporter of hydrocarbons, particularly gas (Closson, 2009).

Moscow is the sole viable option for exporters, making it difficult for Europe to depend on other energy supplies outside Russia. The present situation has given Russia considerable latitude in pricing control (Hedlund, 2011). Besides, the energy supply could be stopped for some causes. As it did in 2009 during the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis, it would significantly negatively impact consumer economies and erode governmental authority in those nations. Consequently, concerning the E.U. nations, the leaders of the West would need to reconsider before opposing the political requests of the provider (Goldman,2010).

Restoring Russia's local political strength by financial means, specifically its mineral assets, as opposed to military methods, comes from the mentality of the present political administration. Vladimir Putin emphasized the significance of regaining national sovereignty over resources constrained by private owners in the 1990s, which might be utilized to further the nation's interests. Additionally, he argued that the government had the power to regulate their creation and use. Without a doubt, the economy of Russia was isolated for quite a long time from other developed markets to have the option to rapidly make up for technology and contend successfully. Putin said it was a mistake to transfer ownership to private owners and emphasized that the government must keep operational

control while enticing foreign financial specialists, citing the financial instability of the 1990s, which promoted privatization. Along these lines, Russia should keep up legislative command over significant organizations and companies, particularly asset-based ones, to rise out of its deep emergency and reestablish its previous power. Morgenthau contends that legislators behave and make choices based on interests associated with the power to advance their target national interests (Keohane, 1886). Instead of militarising over a long period and with focused resources, Russia must exploit its massive energy resources quickly and effectively to build power and develop a powerful strategy.

2.3 Europe and Russia Interdependence

A straightforward clarification of monetary relations between market players is that customers and providers are commonly keen on exchanging products to expand trade (Wheelan, 2010). According to this viewpoint, energy dependency or trade between European nations and Russia should be advantageous to both the provider and the consumer. Surely, European nations need energy, accurately, gas, since its interest is consistently developing; and Russia needs financial help, and its primary income originates from exports of hydrocarbon; and, crucially, Russia's most valuable customers are countries in Europe, for example, Italy and Germany (Closson, Stacy., 2009). Russia gets itself monetarily relies on Europe (Ericson, 2009), and Europe intensely depends on cleaner energy (Commission, 2001).

The gas can be provided most economically after a pipeline has been built. The construction expense is mostly incurred upfront, and it normally takes 25 years for gas consumers to buy enough fuel to pay for the project. Following the pipeline construction and genuinely connecting the supplier and the buyer, a provider has colossal market power over its customer. This is because installing a pipeline is expensive compared to the low cost per transmitted unit of energy (Ericson, 2009). For the situation of Europe-Russia energy relations, the current gas transportation framework was worked during the Soviet times; and Moscow, having stayed away from the need for significant ventures contribution in pipelines development, showed up in a place of the compelling imposing business model over energy assets spilling from Asia to Europe as a result of an absence of other significant elective courses interfacing the previous and the latter.

Simultaneously, different E.U. nations have various degrees of dependence on energy imported from Moscow. Even though the total general, imported gas supply from Moscow comprises around 33% of the total E.U. utilization, the main seven E.U. nations (Slovakia, Romania, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria) acquire all of its gas from Russia, along with six other countries (Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Austria, and Greece) depend on Russian gas imports of around 50% (Aalto, 2009). The other ten E.U. nations recently acknowledged into Europe after the E.U. enlargement have an inheritance of a profoundly evolved energy relationship with Moscow, improved over the years. The basis for several pressures between the E.U. as a multinational political substance and the individual E.U. nations regarding the formation and implementation of a mutual energy security approach for the

E.U. is the current energy cooperation between the individual E.U. member states and Russia, more specifically, the various degrees of their reliance on Russian gas.

Unquestionably, each nation looks for the ideal ways that could be available to ensure its national advantages. That additionally applies to energy security. The imbalance of monetary improvement among the E.U. nations and each state's extraordinary topographical location influence how much to acquire energy assets to run their markets proficiently. Verifiably, industrialized E.U. economies, for example, Italy, France, and Germany, would require a bigger number of assets to cover their energy requirements than those that slow. For instance, the German governmental administration decided to shut down Germany's nuclear facilities before 2023 in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in 2011 (Online, 2012) and afterward, step by step, replaced with green gas, principally from Russia. All the while, Poland and France are conceptualizing the development of new atomic power-producing facilities to diminish their energy reliance on different providers. In this manner, prioritization of the monetary interests by the E.U. nations over combined ones unavoidably sabotages the E.U.'s ability to act viably as a solitary voice to manage any difficulties that this political substance may confront.

To meet the gas requirements of the European Union. Russia agreed to long-term agreements on the take-or-pay energy market basis with several European nations. Therefore, governments should be responsible for paying for freshly created gas, regardless of how much is utilized. According to this theory, any effort to switch service providers before the agreement's expiry would need a large financial spend for the assets that weren't yet taken. The landlocked E.U. wants to boost Russia's potential financial advantage. Nations cannot attempt to switch from Russian gas to gas from other sources in the medium term. The financial sustainability of LNG is still debatable because of the high cost of LNG transportation and terminal building. Russia appreciates a "natural imposing business model" on gas supply to certain E.U. nations for at least 10–15 years, implying that they would stay dependent upon the energy assets of Russia in the close term until a powerful replacement is imagined.

Russia-European Union energy collaboration isn't mutual. Ensuring supply security and sustainability is the main goal of the E.U.'s energy security plan (Closson, 2009). Supply enhancement is a key component of the strategy for energy security. It can be accomplished distinctly by realizing market rules and rivalry standards (Aalto, 2009), permitting different players reasonable access to the energy market resources, including Gazprom. On the other hand, to ensure energy demand by lucrative European clients, Russia attempts to create an infrastructure that restrains the market and restricts foreign investment in its domestic energy market.

Moscow also makes an effort to make a more significant entry into the European energy market through its Gazprom Company through long-term contracts with current customers and direct investments in the projects of other current and potential European energy providers in Africa, Latin America, the Caspian Basin, and the Middle East. This is done to exercise as much control as possible over the European Union's energy supply (Closson, 2009). To sustain energy supplies and meet the E.U.'s rising energy needs, Russia must import a significant quantity of gas from the Caspian and Central Asian areas (Overland, 2009). Additionally, while various gas fields in Russia remain

undiscovered, foreign financial specialists are not invited to upgrade new fields alone. Russia demands cooperation in such ventures of state-controlled organizations, especially Gazprom. In any case, by the selective application of the legislation, the Russian government restricts foreign investment and imposes some barriers (Wöstheinrich, 2016). The allegation is made that foreign investment has generally been seen as delivering an unjustified investor impact within one's nation and may be interpreted as infringing sovereignty, according to a customary defense of not including outside investments (Quester, 2007). Widespread investor involvement in the Russian energy sector would indicate the sector's expansion and, consequently, a weaker state infrastructure that controls the distribution, transportation, and extraction of the country's primary energy supply that may be used as a tool of coercion. As long as each country uses a different supply and demand security approach, the energy links between Russia and the E.U. countries may be complementary.

3. Research Methodology

As the primary approaches for addressing the issues, realism and constructivism theories are employed to analyze Russia's global relations with specific European states, the European Union, and the post-Soviet region.

4. Data Analysis (Key Challenges for Europe)

4.1 Diversifications prospects

To reestablish its reputation for being a solid energy provider to Europe after 2009 cut-offs, Moscow has repeatedly convinced the E.U. that the South project, which would connect Europe and Russia without using Ukraine, the primary transit nation for Russian gas deliveries to Europe, has to move more swiftly. Moscow argues for its stance by charging Ukraine with a lack of consistency in upholding its travel commitments (Pirani, 2009). Hence, Russia demands that the energy supply through antagonistic transit countries should unquestionably stay away from it (Asia, 2010). The cost assessment of the pipeline development over the base of the Black Sea, around €24 billion (Vladimir, 2009), sensibly questions the financial capability of the project: it would not supply an extra amount of gas to E.U.; 63 billion cubic meters would essentially be rerouted from Ukraine's transit system to avoid Ukraine (Asia, 2010). Suppose the Nord Stream was to be added to the South Stream with a 55 cm annual gas transportation constraint. In that case, the Ukrainian pipeline, which now records for transferring around 120 bcm of gas to E.U. purchasers yearly, may lose its distinction.

The Nabucco pipeline project's goal is to diminish reliance on bringing in gas exclusively from Russia. With an assessed yearly supply limit of 31 bcm (Nabucco Gas Pipeline), One of the objectives of the E.U.'s Solidarity and Energy Security Action Plan, which also includes the Nabucco project, is the development of a southern gas conduit for the supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern area (Europa, 2009) and became "leader project" of the E.U. energy security strategy. Even though its development is less expensive contrasted with the South project, despite this, because Nabucco is having problems running the channeling and finding sufficient assets to supply the pipeline with gas, investors are skeptical about the capacity of advanced investments to deliver rapid profits. Iran was formerly

considered a significant gas supplier for the Nabucco project. However, until the situation is handled, Iranian natural gas is unlikely to be used due to ongoing concerns about Iran's atomic program. Access to the fossil resources of the Central Asian countries that made up the former Soviet Union would be a new option to get the necessary amount of gas for the Nabucco project. Up until this point, this choice isn't practical for two aims. No pipeline may be built on the Caspian's bed due to disagreements among the coastal nations over the body's precise status. It is still debatable whether it should be classified as an ocean or a lake. As part of the second stage, Moscow locked up available and future gas supply in long-term Gazprom agreements (Ericson, 2009). Therefore, even though Nabucco expansion alternative bodes well, it will probably not be actualized shortly because of the absence of obvious solutions for afforested troubles rapidly.

4.2 Common Energy Strategy

To manage current eccentricities stemming from alleged energy security difficulties (Aalto, 2009). Russia, the European Union's member states, and the E.U. all work together as a triangle. While anticipating that the member states will take a unilateral stance to withstand concurrent heterogeneous energy dependence, particularly on Russian fossil fuels, the European Union makes an effort to act as an integrator motor to implement and shape a typical energy security strategy in both outer and inner dimensions. In reality, Russian-European and energy cooperation throughout Europe increased certain novel qualities after the appearance of another player, to be specific the E.U., that progressed a unified energy strategy for the benefit of the E.U. nations without really importing gas (Sutela, 2009). Simultaneously, Existing forms of energy cooperation, particularly between Russia and European states, are regularly strained by applying the tied-together technique toward integrating energy security.

Before the E.U.'s founding, the main effort to envision a typical technique for the European Economic Community's combined energy strategy was revived in 1988, highlighting the importance of using free-market standards in the internal Europe energy market. After the fall of the USSR, the political landscape of the E.U. underwent significant change, with the emergence of new players known as energy transit nations and the entry of another political force, specifically the E.U., which prompted the revision of the current energy strategy and the search for new avenues for energy cooperation between the E.U. and other countries. To "create a legitimate institution for energy security, in light of the norms of open, modest markets and sustainable growth (Energy Charter)," the E.U. launched an initiative at the beginning of the 1990s. This concept has been made explicit in the ECT (Energy Charter Treaty), with a crucial focus on enhancing common principles to provide a more appropriate and effective framework for cross-border cooperation than reciprocal understandings provide. In 1994, 51 countries, including the majority of E.U. members, transit countries (including Turkey, Moldova, and Ukraine), and energy-producing countries, including Russia, commemorated the Treaty.

Implementing the Treaty temporarily, Russia wouldn't approve it, and the agreement would sabotage the nation's financial advantages (Daily, 2006). Indeed, the key explanation was an absence of understanding between Russia

and the E.U. over the arrangements of the Transit convention of the Energy Charter. Russia demanded that "the report should incorporate the 'right of first rejection' if a long-period agreement doesn't coordinate the long-period contract," truly giving an "outsider access" to the Russian transportation framework, particularly for the Caspian producers.

Alternately, the E.U. means "the non-discriminating entrance of organizations and other nations to the pipelines of Russia, basically the gas transportation system organized by state gas company, Gazprom. If that happened, Russia would have to give up its tight monopoly control over energy transmission (Aalto, 2009) and become a simple travel nation for Central Asia and the Caspian producers.

The E.U. decided to search for other forms of energy cooperation with Moscow due to its disappointing interactions with Russia about the content of the Energy Charter Treaty. In the 2000 Russia-EU Summit, it was consented to start a separate Russia-E.U Energy Dialog (Espuny, 2009). The E.U. states gave the E.U. Commission the order to offer the Russian government a genuine reciprocal kind of energy cooperation in its capacity as an international authority. The European Union promised Russia to take an interest in developing the European Union's common market in addition to the financial, technical, and institutional aid stipulated under the Charter Agreement (Closson, 2009). Simultaneously discussion in the structure of the Russia-E. U Energy Dialog is consistently intense when the matter of fossil assets is raised. The two players' competing basic interests are the main issue. Moscow strives for long-term agreements for gas, technology, and investment, coordination with the E.U. Investment Bank, and avoiding limits on imports of energy-related items to increase supply security. Moscow allegedly intends to establish an open Russian energy market and fair investment conditions, according to the E.U.

To additionally build up a consistent multilateral methodology towards combined energy security, in 2008, the E.U. followed a combined action plan highlighting the inadequacy of explicit national arrangements according to the coordination of energy markets and frameworks in the E.U. and the need to build up a plan for 2050 (Europa, Press releases, 2010). Simultaneously, consistent increases in energy utilization throughout the E.U. raised genuine environmental worries highlighted in the energy and climate package of the E.U. The plan calls for a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% increase in renewable energy usage in the E.U., and a 20% reduction in essential energy consumption compared to expected levels by refining energy efficiency that will be accomplished by the end of 2020. In 2011 the E.U. complementing the Russia-E.U current energy strategies solidified an expectation to build up another long-period Russia-E.U cooperation methodology as the Russia-E.U Roadmap for Collaboration in the Energy Division until 2050 (Common Understanding-2050).

Therefore, the E.U. is constantly searching for various approaches to advance energy cooperation with providers by building up various procedures and ideas. Other than everything else, they mean to relieve the current different degrees of the association on imported energy assets between the E.U. nations and different energy importers and reinforce the E.U.'s capacity to respond consistently to threats to its security actual and potential.

Building LNG plants that rely on Middle Eastern and African suppliers is another option for Europe to switch its energy supply from Russia. This option is feasible but more costly than others. LNG projects are very expensive and require significant advanced investment and duties by the consumers and producers. For the guarantee of a dependable supply, reliance on LNG would need adequate degasification and liquefaction facilities. To guarantee the security of interest, long-term contracts should be made, together with regular maintenance. Supply and security concerns are important factors that influence the LNG option's possibility of high fixed costs. Other than that, if LNG is economically practical for the nations with the sea to get quick, this alternative barely makes economic logic for the land-bolted nations, specifically for the Central nations of Europe, which as of now, acquire energy supplies from Moscow means of pipelines. Thus, it is anticipated that the LNG component of the E.U. gas market, which is now at a level of roughly 20%, will remain small for what it's worth over the next couple of decades due to the high cost necessary to establish LNG infrastructure. To be sure, somewhat LNG would lessen developing reliance on Russia's gas, particularly for the West E.U. nations, yet is probably not going to adjust the existing uneven relationship in the Russia-European Union energy cooperation.

4.3 European and Central Asia Energy Security

With the present policy to keep up control in the E.U. energy market (Ericson, 2009), Moscow also searches eastbound for broad energy participation with energy needing East Asian and Chinese economies (Poussenkova, 2010). The main components of the eastern energy plan were detailed in the "Eastern Gas Program," which the Russian Federation Industry released in 2007. According to this proposal, Russian Eastern Siberia's gas reserves and production will increase to fulfill the demands of both Chinese and future East Asian customers (Gazprom, 2011).

China's economic boom set the most adaptable and exceptionally monetarily position for Russia to develop energy links with China. Similarly, Beijing also sees Moscow as a significant future energy partner for several reasons. First, their proximity has strategic importance since it makes it possible to integrate upstream and downstream activities at a lower cost and without the need for intermediaries. Second, by diversifying its energy sources, Beijing can increase its energy security, a major issue. China is now the world's largest CO₂ producer due to its mostly coal-based domestic energy production; as a result, it expects worldwide criticism about escalating environmental difficulties (Øverland, 2009). As of now, there is no choice has been made after the start of the development of gas pipelines. The primary matter is that both sides can't agree on the price of natural gas. China wants lower prices accentuating the need to keep up a rivalry with the elective source of local energy production, specifically coal. Russia, then again, endeavors to help out China through long-period agreements for the gas supply. As the government of Russia brought up, such a long-period promise is the reason for the choice of the construction of a pipeline (Poussenkova, 2009).

Because Beijing and Moscow couldn't agree on a gas price and there was uncertainty about their gas relationship's future, Beijing grew increasingly reliant on other energy supplies, notably those in Central Asian nations like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The fourth-largest gas reserves in the world are now found in Turkmenistan. This

main Central Asian nation supplies its hydrocarbons to China using the pipeline with an anticipated export yearly limit of 40 bcm (Dyer, 2009). At the same time, China is discussing gas supply with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The building of a pipeline connecting Kazakhstan's gas deposits with the current transportation network, which originates in Turkmenistan and passes via Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China, was agreed upon by Kazakhstan and China in 2011 (Reuters, 2012). Furthermore, China would get 15 billion extra cubic meters of gas from this network. Kazakhstan typically exports an additional 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year (Times, 2013).

Key ramifications for the E.U. security strategy in extending energy participation among Central E.U. energy suppliers and China are that the volumes of gas would be sufficient for different consumers, explicitly China. Russia would benefit from Europe's prolonged dependence on the Russian oil supply by maintaining its exclusive transit rights from Asia to the E.U. without losing its stronger position as the purchaser of Central Asian gas. If Russia linked the energy resources in East and West Siberia and if China and Russia resolved their disagreement over gas prices, a new, serious issue for the European Union's energy security would arise. Should political pressure disrupt the E.U.'s energy market, Moscow would no longer be dependent on the E.U. for its energy agreements, and its needs for Russian fossil resources, and revenues would be secure.

4.4 Future Possibility for European Integration

The foreign Strategy of Russia toward Europe weaves together numerous strands of Putin's strategy of arrangement with the Euro-Atlantic group to foster global consistency and support the modernization of Russia. At first look, Russia's links with Europe show up fundamentally positive. Europe is neither unfriendly to Moscow nor a conceivably undermining military-political organization similar to NATO. Russian-E. U trade relations are imperative for the economy of Russia, and Brussels offers substantial assistance and expertise for the economic reforms of Russia. Moreover, as Europe becomes more dependent on Russian energy supplies, Moscow is not the only reliant party in the relationship. Relations between the E.U. and Russia can satisfy Russia's requirement for outer interlocutors that accommodate a Russian voice on the worldwide stage and back Russia's inner transformation.

The mix of E.U. development and the association's rise as a security player, in any case, raises problems for Russia, the first being doubt. The leadership of Russia is unsure of Europe's future part and its strategies toward Moscow. In the long term, is a coalition in Europe taking shape? By what method will the new nations influence the E.U.'s strategy toward Moscow? Will Europe make more efforts to meddle in Russia's local matters? To what degree will Russia have the option to exploit links with the old partners? There are no suitable and clear answers to these questions.

The second problem is psychological; even though Putin does not want to be isolated on the E.U.'s periphery, subject to grow beyond its control. Europe extension is obscuring the distinction between the E.U. and the possibility of Europe, and the two ideas are combining. For all his realism, Putin has constantly confirmed Russia-

European work and attached the new Federation's destiny of Russia to that of Europe. Collaboration between a previous domain in retreat and a growing force can't be required to come without problems. The border areas between Belarus and Ukraine and the Caucasus will probably include friction as lines of influence and power become clearer. This was clear in Moscow's reactions to the discussions in Brussels (2003) when Europe discussed an ESDP operation to supplant the Russian-drove peacekeeping operation in Moldova (Lynch, 2003). In public, Russia responded calmly to the thought; in private, Moscow's reactions were a mix of concern, anxiety, and astonishment.

Putin started his presidency seeking more unsurprising and pleasing universal partners for Russia's state consolidation. The E.U. had pride of spot in his vision. The E.U. remains capricious, and Russia is minimally more locked in. Indeed, Russia finds itself pushed to the sidelines, confronting the truth that a unified Europe is being worked at the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, without Russia.

4. Conclusion of the Study

Understanding Russian foreign policy may be aided by the theoretical framework of the political authenticity theory, which sees the world as a radical setting in which state actors must use coping mechanisms. According to the thesis, it is improbable that the Russian military will be able to serve as an effective instrument of the state's authority shortly. Extreme energy supply constraints from Moscow to the E.U. in 2009 proved that an economic weapon had been employed. These shortages put several parties in danger of severe financial difficulty and sparked public alarm. This economic weapon produced outcomes comparable to those of utilizing military force but without terrible human suffering and observable physical devastation. From this perspective, rather than its weak military, Russia's behavior across the globe is defined by its dependence on significant economic sectors that are highly desired and vital to other nations, namely, its rich oil resources. The fundamental requirement for Russia to increase its economic dominance over other nations should be to compel the state to give up control of energy production, transportation, and distribution to consumers, as was done previously with gas and monopolists Gazprom under Vladimir Putin's administration.

Due to the established energy connection between the E.U. nations and Russia, particularly those that also happen to be E.U. members, Moscow has all the prerequisites to utilize economic power as a foreign policy tool. First, active and operational pathways for transferring energy link Russian energy sources with European consumers. Third, several approaches to tackling energy security are possible depending on how dependent the E.U. is on Russian energy, which may range from completely dependent to completely dependent. Second, even if the energy demand is rising and the output of petroleum derivatives in the E.U. is continually declining, Russia has enough energy resources to meet the E.U.'s demands. Additionally, imposing economic intimidation measures on Europe undermines the political unity of the E.U.'s capacity to oppose potential Russian aggressive behavior overseas. The European Union has to properly diversify its energy sources to reduce its current dependency on Russian hydrocarbons. All of the possibilities are either capital-escalating or expensive up front, or they would increase the

reliance of European Union energy consumers on Russia, which might cause political issues. The southern energy corridor improvement is seen as the most economically and politically feasible alternative for the E.U. to differentiate its energy sources; however, the future of this decision is doubtful. Due to several factors, including the uncertain status of Iran's nuclear program, the Caspian Sea's contentious location that prevents Europe and Central Asia from coming together while avoiding Russia, and the recent rise in energy participation in Asia, it is unclear who will provide enough energy to justify the pipeline's development costs. Instead of using the military as a tool of state power, Russia may depend on the energy resource as a dealing weapon to further its political objectives, particularly in the E.U.

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